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Abstract  
Variously, tangible efforts have been invested by the Nigerian Police towards combating internal terrorism. Yet, 
adequate security of lives and properties has remained elusive. This study adopts qualitative descriptive mechanism. 
We argue that the Nigerian Police has not been able to effectively guarantee the security of lives and properties of 
Nigerians. Major institutional, operational and intelligence limitations are at the root of the security crisis in Nigeria. 
On these grounds, we submit therefore, that the government should fundamentally equip the Police Force, and 
provide intelligence architectures, so as to better reposition the Force towards effective securitization. 
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Introduction 
 
One important lesson one can learn from Maslow’s hierarchy of need is the ultimate importance attached to the issue 
of security. Other principal philosophers of antiquity, including Hobbes had also stressed the vitality of security and 
its centrality in the purpose of government. Hence, the need for governance to guarantee objective and subjective 
security, or root out real hazards as well as conditions stimulating paranoia and other kinds of irrational fear amongst 
the populace it struck a social contract with. In this direction, the Nigerian state through its constitution made 
provision for the creation of the Nigerian Police Force.Section 214(1) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria states that 
“There shall be a Police Force for Nigeria, which shall be known as the Nigerian Police Force, and subject to the 
provisions of this section no other police force shall be established for the federation or any part thereof. By this 
establishment, the Nigeria Police Force becomes the primary law enforcement agency responsible for maintaining 
law and order in the country. It therefore plays the prime role of ensuring internal security of the nation. Part of this 
internal security purpose is the containment of illegal arms, which in itself dangerously undermines the safety of the 
country, especially when wielded by outlaws. However, too many criticisms have trailed the force, especially in its 
contribution to the deteriorating security system of the country. For instance, Onu and Biereenu-Nnabugwu stated 
this about the Force: Another way of explaining the problem of inefficient security system is the police force itself. 
These include indiscipline, poor training, lack of expertise in specialized field, poor pay, illiteracy, and lack of 
willingness to learn. It also includes lack of patriotism, lack of regard for dignity of labour and blind eye to what is 
obtainable in developed countries of the world. The problem of corruption and dishonesty is an acceptable tradition 
(Onu and Biereenu-Nnabugwu, 2007) 
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Particularly, the disruption of Nigeria’s 50th Independence Anniversary on October 1, 2010 by the shelling of 
Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND); the shattering of Nigeria’s Force Headquarters in Abuja, 
on the 16th of June, 2011; and the dismantling of the United Nations House, Abuja, on the 26th of August, 2011, 
both by the explosives of Boko Haram Islamic sect, among other numerous cases, climaxes the ineffectiveness of the 
Nigerian Police Force. In all, over 100 explosives have been detonated so far by illegally armed groups and persons 
in Nigeria between 1999 and 2011, with innumerable thousands of important lives blown off in the process 
(Vanguard, July 8, 2011). Therefore, this study seeks to link between the Nigeria Police operational and intelligence 
capacity and the steady expansion of the activities of illegally armed groups and persons in the country. 
 
 
The Problematic of Non-Implementation of Arms Tracking System in Nigeria 
 
The security dilemma pervading the Nigerian state can easily be calculated upon the operational and intelligence 
limitation of the Nigerian police force. In simple trace, the Nigerian Police leadership has not been able to implement 
the law, stipulated in the Article 5 of the Code of Conduct of the ECOWAS Moratorium, which among other things 
includes ‘the registration and control of the movement and use of legitimate arms stock’ (ECOWAS, 1998). The 
import of the exercise, as Diarra noted, is to introduce a sort of “identity card” for weapons, by identifying them with 
a number on their bodies in order to make them easier to trace, either when they are taken from one country to 
another or when they are sold or borrowed (Diarra, 2005). Hence, it is a sort of solid identifiable label or tag on all 
legitimate weapons been imported or legitimately produced in Nigeria with an accompanying central office file. This 
Register, compiled and maintained at the local level, not only contains details of the identity of the weapons 
(registration number, date of manufacture, terms of acquisition, etc.), but also “tracks” them when they circulate 
(transfer following the death of the owner, sale, loan, theft etc.). Moreover, marking requirements are also included 
in both the Firearms Protocol within the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime of 2001, as well as the 
OAS Conventions (Cukier and Chapdelaine, 2001). Also, in 2005, Nigeria further adopted the International 
Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (Erlandsson and Weitsch, 
2008). But there has not been any responsible effort taken to this effect. Unfortunately, in Nigeria, people do not get 
penalized or questioned for not implementing the law. The problem with this inaction, however, is that there are but 
little, or even empty, intelligence on the totality of legal weapons accumulated in the country over period. Nigeria 
imports arms from a number of sources including; United States: US-cartridges of about USD 246,007 between 1999 
and 2002; UK: shotguns, cartridges and parts of about USD 90,953 between 1999 and 2002; Italy: revolvers and 
shotguns of about USD 49,074 in 2001; Germany: revolvers/pistols, about USD 13,062 in 1999 (Cross, Catherine 
and Mclean, 2004). Several thousands of AK-47s has also been fabricated by the Defense Industries Corporation of 
Nigeria (DICON) located in Kaduna. In all these, there are no comprehensive and reliable documentation on the 
stockpiles of the Nigerian armory, as well as importations and local production of legitimate arms in the country 
(Hazen and Horner, 2007). The point being made here is that most weapons that have now become illegal were once 
legal in the time of their importation or use by the security agencies and other legally authorized persons. Cukier and 
Chapdelaine further stated that: Unlike illicit drugs which are illegal from production, through distribution and 
Public Policy and Administration Research                                        www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-5731(Paper) ISSN 2225-0972(Online) 
Vol.2, No.2, 2012 
 
 
25 
 
consumption, virtually every illegal weapon which is misused began as a legal commodity. They may be diverted 
from licit to illicit markets through a variety of means including: theft, illegal sales, reactivation etc. Thus, the 
emphasis that both domestic and international efforts to regulate firearms and reduce illicit trafficking and misuse 
rest on the ability to track individual firearms. Firearm manufacturers often serve both commercial and military 
markets and so the issue of marking is of interest to both those concerned with preventing crime and those focused 
on monitoring the sources of illegal weapons (Cukier and Chapdelaine, 2001). 
 
The implementation of this marking standard by the Police and other security agencies would have enabled the 
identification of the point of departure (local station where the arms are assigned) of most of the various illegal arms 
used by illegally armed groups and persons, who normally obtain these weapons by fowl means, from assorted 
legitimate sources. With this information, there could have been an effective checkmating and control of legal arms 
traded or given out, as sympathetic support to a cause or belief by official sources, to several illegally armed groups 
and person in the country. Therefore, the mere warning issued by the former Inspector General of Police, Mike Okiro 
during a meeting with Mobile Police Force Squadron (PMF) Commanders, in Abuja, that policemen whose guns 
attached to them are stolen or nowhere to be found will be held responsible and face stiffer punishments (Daily Trust, 
December 11, 2008) is never sufficient. This is because the uncontrollable penchant for illegal sales by serving and 
retired security personnel poses a major concern with regard to the circulation of illegal weapons. This problem was 
publicly acknowledged by President Obasanjo in December 2002, when he stated that “the majority of small arms 
and light weapons circulating in Nigeria were either sold or rented out by, or stolen from, the country’s security 
agencies” (Ginifer and Ismail, 2005). Obasanjo further stated that, “Most of the ammunition we have found in wrong 
hands have come from security agencies…the police, the military…Only recently, we found that 3000 rounds of 
ammunition were sold here in Abuja by the police and in 10s by the military (Erlandsson and Weitsch, 2008). In fact, 
this shows that security officials have lost quantum of their weapons through theft and sabotage. Security officials 
have provided weapons to ethnic militias in their home areas, with one customs official claiming the donation of 16 
G3 rifles as his “contribution to the Niger Delta cause” (Ebo, 2006). To give vent to this thrust, a content analysis of 
about 11 national dailies that featured on the International Firearms Injury Prevention and Policy daily gun policy 
review confirmed that over 15 army officers and about 30 police officers has been involved in the sale of hundreds of 
AK-47s and Machine Guns to rebels between 2007 and 2010[13] Some of these sales were reported to have taken 
place in the police station. An important illegal trade of all history was the sale of over 7,000 military weapons 
belonging to the Nigerian armory to a militant group, Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) by 
Major Sulaiman Alabi Akubo and five other soldiers, which fetched them a windfall of over N100 million and a 
reprisal of life imprisonment (The Punch, November 28, 2008; Leadership, November 19, 2008; Voice of America, 
November 19, 2008). 
 
A survey of an armed group members conducted in Bayelsa state also revealed that the majority of respondents 
received assistance from the police (30.4 per cent), the mobile police (14.7 per cent), and the military (24.5 per cent) 
in obtaining small arms (Isumonah., Tantua and James, 2006). Beside this, there is also some evidence of diversion 
or recycling of weapons from decommissioning exercises into the illegal trade. Soldiers returning from peacekeeping 
missions have also sold small arms in the black market, providing ‘a ready source of assault weapons’ for the 
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Nigerian population, and in addition provided training to militants. Thus, the armed groups in the Delta have 
displayed “superior strategies and tactics using better training and organization” (Hazen and Horner, 2007). All these 
speaks for the absence of attention focused on ways of tracing and preventing weapons that moves from legal to 
illegal users which is mainly controllable through effective tracking of legal weapons. This can only be made 
possibly through effective arms marking scheme.  
 
More disturbing, however, is the fact that these legitimate weapons being traded often ends up in the illicit arms 
market where they are further resold to other dangerous users. This trend has not been impeded by the police over the 
years. Also, local blacksmiths that couples other illegal weapons which flood the illicit markets have not been 
effectively checkmated by the police. Several hidden places in Nigeria have been doted as sites of local fabrication of 
these illicit arms. Hazen and Horner further stated that “production techniques applied in local productions is mainly 
rudimentary. No machines are used in the production process. Vises, steel saws, manual drills, and files are employed 
in the fabrication process, with small makeshift furnaces used to heat the metals” (Hazen and Horner, 2007). This 
fabrication of craft weapons usually takes place in producers’ homes or backyards. In addition to production of craft 
arms, these blacksmiths often produce other tools, such as hunting traps, gardening implements, and machetes. And 
the materials used in the process are all sourced locally. Table 1 depicts that there is still an uninterrupted illegal craft 
production of small arms in Awka, the capital city of Anambra state. While table 2 shows few other manufacturers of 
illegal arms that the police were able to arrest between 2006 and 2010. It is quite odd that only a few of these illegal 
productions have been interrupted by the police from the available records. This is because, until several years ago, 
craft producers had marked their weapons with  numbers and symbols of recognition. These identifying marks were 
used by police to trace weapons used in crimes. This led to the prosecution of craft producers whose weapons had 
been implicated in criminal activities, and consequently a halt to the practice of marking. Currently, craft weapons 
are not marked with individual identifiers (Hazen and Horner, 2007). And this makes it very difficult for the police to 
trace. Therefore, these productions have continued to thrive. The significance of the local production of illegal 
weapons can be observed in table 2, where the data presented indicates that border security agents confiscated very 
small quantities of arms each year, but by contrast large numbers of rounds of ammunition. While this would be 
expected, as more ammunition is required than weapons, the number of weapons according to the table is 
disproportionately small compared to the amount of ammunition seized. This gross discrepancy in the balance of the 
flow of illegal weapons in favour of ammunition over firearms clearly suggests that local productions have 
considerably been filling the gap of most of the demands for illegal firearms by illegally armed groups and persons. 
Since perhaps, local fabricators lacked relevant technology for making more ammunition.  
 
A respondent had claimed in December 2003 that every village in Nigeria had between 20 to 100 AK-47 assault 
rifles in its community armouries (Yacubu, 2005; WAC Global Services, cited in Hazen and Horner 2007). For 
instance, in Warri, an oil-rich town in the Delta, youths have openly hawked pistols and automatic rifles referred to 
by local dealers as ‘pure water’. Pistols can be much cheaper. The high cost of purchasing an AK-47 in the Delta 
suggests that there is scarcity value. In Nigerian price terms, a double-barreled shotgun costs between 50,000 and 
65,000 naira, a single-barreled shotgun between 25,000 and 30,000 naira; the price of pistols ranges between 3,000 
and 7,000 naira, depending on the model, the seller and the place of sale. A suspect arrested in September 2001 by 
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the Plateau state police for unlawful possession of firearms admitted that two of the weapons in his possession had 
been purchased two years previously for 55,000 and 75,000 naira (Yacubu, 2005). Some informants suggested that 
prices rises during escalation of conflicts (Ojudu, 2007). A number of towns are known for the availability of 
weapons, including Asaba, Benin City, Aba, Onitsha, Enugu, Owerri, Awka, and Port Harcourt (Small Arms Survey, 
2007a). However, table 3 below shows a nosedive in price index of illegal weapons traded in the illicit markets in 
Nigeria between 2003 and 2007. This suggests that more illicit guns are made available to the illicit markets during 
this period. 
 
The Problematic of Weak Internal Policing 
 
An important area where the police have not effectively performed towards the containment of the sources of illegal 
arms is in the area of weak internal policing. The point being made here is that illegal arms are not mostly used or fired 
from their very sources, whether smuggled or locally manufactured. Illegally armed groups and persons normally 
move these weapons from one place to the other in order to make meaningful use of them. Therefore, the porousness of 
the Nigerian roads caused by weak internal policing facilitates this movement. This, in essence, sustains the linkage 
between the sources and the consumers. However, some factors are responsible for this, among which are inadequate 
distribution of police stations in the country, poor motivation of police officers, and insufficient weapons and 
intelligence equipments.  
 
For instance, a police reform proposal put up by the former Minister of Police Affairs, General David Jemibewon 
recommended that police deployment needs to take into consideration some important factors including, political 
settings, population, crime-rate and land mass. According to this proposal, the police formations in divisional, area, 
state, zonal and force headquarters should be aligned to correspond with local government, senatorial districts, states, 
the six geo-political zones and the federal government as they presently exist. A police post was recommended at the 
ward level and about three to five police posts to constitute a police station (Thisday, February 9, 2002). The problem 
with this formation however, is that in the end, there are several incongruities in the distribution of the police offices 
across the country. For instance, the allocation of about 204 Village Posts to Bayelsa state of about 1.7 million 
population, and only 1 Village Post to Abia state with well over 2.8 million population, is absolutely unacceptable. And 
in reality, as Nigeria is presently constituted, there may not be a ‘hot crime zone’ per se, as everywhere constitutes 
potential insecurity. Table 4 below clearly highlights this incongruity and inconsistency. Of course, this explains why 
various localities are not effectively policed thereby giving cover to local manufacturers of illegal weapons. Again, a 
comparism of 2006 and 2007 figures shows a downward trend especially in numbers of Village Posts where internal 
surveillance is needed most. In the end, both the local producers and the consumers of illegal weapons are not 
interrupted. But more disappointing is the fact that those constables who mount on the highways lacked important 
surveillance equipment with which to detect arms while in transit. Only appropriate intelligence facilities can help in 
an effective way to identify the groups and individuals that are engaged in the manufacture, sale, storage, transfer, 
possession and distribution of these illegal weapons. This calls for sophisticated intelligence equipment such as 
electronic communication facilities, bomb detectors, scanners, digital fingerprinting machines, radios, intercoms, 
computers and more importantly the Close Circuit Television (CCTV). 
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In fact, there is no reason why Nigerian police should not have the CCTV in each station or even adequate weapons 
detectors spread on the highways in order to effectively monitor movement of illegal weapons and concealed bombs. In 
Nigeria, there are too many checkpoints though, but the mobile police men on duty have never been on top of the 
situation because they lacked important surveillance equipment.  
 
The Corruptive Tendencies Sweeping off the Nigerian Police Force 
Most alarming is the custom of settlement which has overtaken the actual place of thorough searching. In this regard, 
several persons have lost their lives for refusal to part with the contentious ’20 naira’ compulsory settlement fee. For 
instance, among many other cases, innocent pilgrims coming home from a pilgrimage were indiscriminately shot dead 
in Anambra state, after a protracted argument on why someone coming from a religious purification should not offend 
his God by giving 20 naira bribe. Also, another husband and wife lost their lives in Anambra state over this issue of 20 
naira (Onu and Biereenu-Nnabugwu, 2007). And regrettably, no effective measures have been taken so far to salvage 
the mobile police men from extorting 20 naira from vehicles on the highway. It gets so worst that when they collect 
they give change.  
 
The long term implication of this operational misconduct is that as the motorists cue compulsorily for the informal 
daily contribution, the day to day socio-economic life of our cities are indirectly disrupted and at the same time, 
motorists held bound in such gridlock run the risk of being cheap targets for intentional or inadvertent terrorist attacks. 
Moreover, in most cases, those motorists and commuters delayed are unavoidably led into night journey where there 
are life threatening risks of accident and armed robbery attacks. The deployment of mobile drive-through vehicle 
scanners could have been mitigated these risks and as well decipher the contents of vehicles plying the roads from safe 
distances and alerts triggered for appropriate counter-terrorism action whenever necessary. In all, the actual function of 
containing the movements and flows of illegal weapons is not achieved. Hence, the police have not done much in 
containing the movement of these illicit weapons. Table 5 show the little police was able to seize between 2000 and 
2010. This figure shown is a pittance when compared to the over three million illegal weapons still circulating in 
Nigeria today. Perhaps, one should blame the weak police structure for this. Nigerian police personnel are poorly 
remunerated. An agency that handles such enormous task of internal peace and security of lives and properties of 
citizens should never be subjected to miserable conditions if they must carry out their functions effectively. Table 6 
shows the breakdown of salaries of Nigerian police officers. 
 
The Operational Capacity and Vulnerability of the Force 
Beside the issue of motivation, however, the police have always resorted to curative than preventive measures in an 
effort to contain the circulation of illegal arms in the country. Most often, the police open fire on armed groups and 
persons when they are in action without doing much to contain the routes through which such weapons are transmitted 
and exchanged. And in most cases, the police have not been succeeding. In fact, in most of these confrontations, as the 
tolls of armed persons shot down are being counted, so as that of the police officers as well as other unsuspecting 
innocent but ill fated citizens, who lost their lives along the line are being counted. The difference, perhaps, is that in 
the case of the later, the issue of paying enormous sacrifice for the nation is mostly chanted, even ignorantly celebrated. 
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This is mainly because the force itself lacked sufficient sophisticated weapons to effectively confront some of these 
illegally armed groups. Table 7 depicts the quantum and the level of sophistication of stockpiles of the Nigerian Police 
Force. This number of weapons can hardly be sufficient for use for over 450,000 officers of the police force. And 
definitely, many of these numbers above may not actually be in usable condition. However, only about 40,000 (forty 
thousand) pieces of AK-47 riffles with 20,000,000 (twenty million) rounds of 7.65x 39mm ammunition; 10,000 pieces 
of Pistol Beretta with two million rounds of .9mm and other ammunition, totaling about 80,000 Guns, 32 Million 
Bullets were later procured in 2007 by the Nigerian Police due to the April General Elections as stated by the then 
Inspector of Police, Mr. Sunday Ehindero (Daily Champion, March 7, 2007). 
 
The Impact on Security of Lives and Properties  
Of course, the consequential impact of these security leakages and inadequacies on effective containment of local 
production and internal movement of illegal weapons is multi-layered. First, the activities of the various armed groups 
have well spread beyond their usual coverage, spreading to various parts of the country uninterruptedly. The following 
tables 8 and 9 shows the progressive expansion of the militant groups in the Niger Delta and a rise in the diversity of 
their attacks respectively. 
 
Bad Governance, Excruciating Poverty, as Trigger Effects  
The situation even becomes worst when added to the fact that there are too many disarticulating variables in the 
Nigerian system that could as well prompt people to take up arms. This is because from all indications, the Nigerian 
project has not been well executed over the past one decade or so. Ikejiani-Clark complain bitterly that Nigeria is 
deeply in trouble, and elsewhere worries that “poor leadership has contributed to a situation where Nigeria ranks 
amongst the poorest in the world in terms of human capital developments, resulting to frustration and instability, with 
militants agitating and invading the territorial space of Niger Delta” (Ikejiani-Clark, 2007).. She eventually 
concludes that “Nigeria itself is a contradiction…” in the sense that she suffers dangerous lack amidst plentitude of 
natural gifting (Ikejiani-Clark and Ezeh, 2008). An Action Congress governorship candidate in Oyo state in 2007 
election, Prof. Taoheed Adedoja once noted that the future of an average Nigerian youth appears helplessly gloomy 
and blank (The Nigerian Tribune, May 8, 2008). If indeed as the National Bureau of Statistics (2010) summated, that 
the percentage of the employable age but unemployed persons in Nigeria alone are well over 20% in 2009, of the 
estimated 149 million population, then there is a serious trouble in the country. Therefore, The Nation, summarizes 
that:  Today, Nigeria’s democracy is the antithesis of every creed, every principles and every tenet of the universe. It 
is the travesty of incompetent and visionless governments nationwide backed by a power greedy but empty party and 
supported by compromised security and defense forces. That should worry the most patience and enduring of souls 
(The Nation, June 27, 2011. p. 1). 
 
Though, our effort here is not to embark on a lengthy examination of literature but to simply establish one point. That 
is, that lack, destitution, politics of exclusion and its accompanying frustrations has become a difficult phenomenon 
that can never be easily disentangled or distillated from the Nigerian system. Hence, it is our utmost contention that 
in spite of this numerous internal contradictions, the government has on top maintained a too porous, loose and 
permeable security details. The outcome of this reality is an overwhelming hike in criminality and an upsurge in the 
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expansion and intensity of the activities of illegally armed groups and persons which have ensured in the period of 
the study. Table 10 shows an upward trend in armed robbery activities between 2002 and 2007, while table 11 
displays a considerable rise in kidnapping in Nigeria between 2002 and 2007. Both cases involve use of illegal 
weapons. 
 
Approximating the Impacts on Internecine Conflicts 
More to this is the high scale of ethnic/communal violence in the country. Bishop Mathew Kuka, in Onu and 
Biereenu-Nnabugwu noted that “It is the federal and state government and their policies of alienation that have led to 
the resuscitation of latent communal identities as a tool for bargaining with a hostile and alien state. It is here that we 
can locate the source of crises that befell our communities across the land” (Onu, and Biereenu-Nnabugwu, 2007). 
Hence, the plethora of ethno-religious militias such as MASSOB, MOSOP, AREWA, OPC, HISBA, Egbesu Boys etc. 
has used illegal weapons to promulgate these crises. But more importantly, however, this study is particularly 
concerned that almost all of these clashes have been mostly fought with locally fabricated firearms (Hazen and 
Horner, 2007). The impact of these illegal weapons has been an unacceptable loss of lives of innocent citizens. Thus, 
over 100, 000 lives have been lost to internecine violence in Nigeria since 1999 (Agboton-Johnson, Ebo and Mazal, 
2004). 
 
The Rising Bomb Attacks, Acts of Terrorism 
In another aspect, the unhindered availability of illegal weapons has largely contributed to a rise in intensity of the 
attacks of illegally armed groups in the country. The most dreaded of these attacks is the incessant use of explosives 
and grenade launchers to blow up the country and its people. This act is the hallmark of terrorism and is mostly 
perpetrated by the Movement of the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) and the Boko Haram Islamic sect, located 
in the Northern part of the country. Though, the bombing trend is not new in Nigeria but our utmost concern is that 
such awful and dangerous act has progressively become more incessant, calamitous, and disastrous in recent times 
especially within the period of study. Table 12 confirms that the bomb tradition is not new in Nigeria, but has become 
increasingly more incessant and lethal within the period of study. The above statistics do not only threaten the 
national security in a dangerous way but has also shown that the nation is unwontedly but gradually falling to the 
status of a failed state. On the rising bomb acclimatization in the country, former Inspector General of Police, Mr. 
Sunday Ehindero lamented: This is an ugly trend that must be swiftly tackled with all seriousness. That was how 
terrorism started in the Middle East; it is a trend that must not be allowed… Before now, the nation was only 
experiencing robbery, which later developed into kidnapping and now bomb blast. Just like kidnapping became a 
difficult menace to handle, my fear is that, if not properly checked, bombing may become another phenomenon that 
will be difficult to combat (The Nation, June 27, 2011. p. 1). 
 
We are not joining the debate though, but an important factor here is that the government and its ‘security system’ are 
on the weak side. A police officer has succinctly captured the vulnerability of members of the force. He had this to 
say: Our lives are no longer safe in the performance of our lawful duties. Whether it is the broad day light or at night, 
you have to be praying to God to save your life as you put on the uniform and set out for work. Being a police man 
has become a danger in itself, because apart from the fact that you are not loved by the members of the society, the 
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Boko Haram and armed robbers are waiting for you out there to put you out of circulation. The worst part is that we 
do not even have the required weapons to confront them. And our men are dying like chicken everyday in large 
numbers. It is a sad development (Daily Sun, December 8, 2011. p. 7). 
 
Of a truth the activities of Boko Haram had taken its toll on the Nigerian Police force. According to the data gathered 
on death benefits paid by various insurance firms to families of the deceased at the Force Headquaters, Abuja; as 
much as 602 police officers and men were killed in just 5 months in the country, between May and September 2011. 
The details are as follows: May – 156; June – 143; August – 122; September – 119 and November – 62 (Daily Sun, 
December 8, 2011. p. 7). 
 
Conclusion 
The study examined the operational and intelligence vulnerability of the Nigerian Police Force. The Nigerian Police 
has not been able to effectively conquer the emerging security threats in the country. More importantly, the Nigeria 
Police which has the key responsibility of maintaining internal peace and security in the country, lacked sufficient 
weaponry and necessary surveillance equipment to execute their job effectively. Besides the observed poor 
remuneration, contributing immensely to the chronic institutional corruption, there is a lopsided structure in the 
distribution of police stations, and in effect police personnel across the country. All these, therefore, form the bases 
for the expansion of the activities of unauthorized armed groups and persons in the country. On these grounds, we 
submit therefore, that the government should fundamentally equip the Police Force, and provide intelligence 
architectures, so as to better reposition the Force towards effective securitization. 
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Table 1: Craft-Produced Small Arms in Awka 
Weapon Features Ammunition Cost 
Pocket 
single-short
handguns 
Approximately 13 cm long; steel muzzle to wooden stock; extremely 
rudimentary hammer requiring cocking; effective only at a distance of 1–2 
m; uses single shotgun cartridge 
Various 
calibers of  
Shortgun 
cartridge 
NGN 4,000/ 
USD 32 
Four-short 
revolver 
Available in manual and automatic configurations 9 mm, 7.5 
mm, or 
8.5 mm 
NGN 8,000/ 
USD 64 
Eight-short 
revolver 
Available in manual and automatic configurations 9 mm, 7.5 
mm, or 
8.5 mm 
NGN 12,000/ 
USD 96 
Single barrel 
shortgun 
B ech-loading; safety cocking 
mechanism 
Various 
calibers of 
shotgun cartridge
NGN 10,000– 
11,000/USD 80–
Horizontal 
double- 
Barrel shortgun
Breech-loading; one trigger for each barrel; safety cocking mechanism Various 
calibers of 
shotgun cartridge
NGN 25,000– 
30,000/USD 
200– 
240 
Vertical 
double- 
Barrel shortgun
Automatic configuration firing both rounds without need for cocking; 
breech-loading 
Various 
calibers of 
shotgun cartridge
NGN 45,000/ 
USD 360 
Source: Hazen, J.M., and Horner, J. (2007).  
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Table 2: Cases of Arrested Illegal Local Arms Producers Across Nigeria Between 2006 and Sept. 2011 
  Date of 
Arrest 
Name of manufacture(s)      Factory site Illegal weapons produced 
- Soloman Akpus, and his master, 
Mgbebe 
Egato, Nasarawa Seven locally manufactured pistols and 
17 live ammunition 
April 
10,2006 
Mr. Cyprian Okeke, 57 years old, 
together with  Obinna Eze, 22 years 
old, and Sunday Ude, 20 years 
Udi LGA, Enugu 
state 
- 
June 3, 2007 Ahmadu Magaji Pandogari Village, 
Rafi LGA, Niger 
state 
40 pistols 
October 24, 
2007 
Mr. Saliu Katam Village, 
Akko LGA, Gombe 
state 
- 
March 2, 
2009 
Baushe Makeri Kotorkoshi Village 
in Bungudu, 
Zamfara state 
11 guns 
April 19, 
2009 
Malam Bala Joji, 83 years Kano Several weapons  
April 12, 
2010 
Abdussamad Barkin Akawa, 
Dadin Kowa, Jos 
South LGA 
explosives 
October 17, 
2010 
  Solomon Mantep, Dorcas 
  Habila and Jummai Gyang. 
    
Kuru, Jos South 
LGA 
Three pistols, seven multipurpose guns, 
AK47 bayonet, three hand drilling 
machines, a filling machine and live 
ammunition 
September 
21, 2011 
Paul Odunze, and Nwanne Ifiodu 
(arms convener/driver) 
Umudioka, 
Dunukofia 
L.G.A, Anambra 
State 
100 bags of live cartridge, 
15 pump actions, 12 double Barrel guns 
Sources: Compiled from, Thisday, May 15, 2006; Thisday, June 4, 2007; Daily Champion, October 25, 2007; Daily Trust, April 21, 
2009; Leadership, March 4, 2009; Weekly Trust, November 20, 2010. Radio Nigeria, September 22, 2011. 
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 Table 3: Reported Prices of AK-47 Assault Rifles in Nigeria, 2003–2007 
    Date of Purchase         
Price*Price* 
    Late 2003         USD 1,700
    December 2004         USD 1,000
    May 2005         USD 300
    November 2006         USD 
1,000–1,500 
    December 2006         USD 
1,500–2,500 
    March 2007         USD 400
   Source: Hazen, J.M., and Horner, J. (2007).  * Prices vary depending on whether the weapon is new or used. 
Table 4: Total Number of Police Area Commands, Divisions, Stations, Posts and Village  Posts,  2006-2007 
                                        2006                          2007 
States No. of Area 
Commands 
No. of 
Divisions 
No. of 
Police 
Stations  
No. of 
Police 
Posts 
No. of 
Village 
Posts 
No of Area 
Commands 
No. of 
Divisions 
Police 
Stations 
No. of 
Police 
Posts 
No. of 
Village 
Posts 
Abia 2 29 22 32 1 2 29 22 32 1 
 Adamawa 3 24 65 102 199 3 24 65 102 199 
A/Ibom 3 32 41 Na Na 3 32 41 Na Na 
Anambra 3 34 52 43 132 3 34 52 43 132 
Bauchi 3 24 38 99 55 3 24 38 99 55 
Bayelsa 3 10 19 30 204 3 28 37 137 204 
Benue 3 28 37 137 61 3 10 19 36 61 
Borno 3 37 42 100 178 3 37 42 100 179 
C/River 2 23 55 23 103 2 23 55 23 103 
Delta 3 33 67 Na 100 3 33 67 Na 100 
Ebonyi 3 13 29 10 69 3 13 29 10 69 
Edo 3 29 31 43 151 3 29 31 43 151 
Ekiti 3 20 21 54 Na 3 20 6 54 Na 
Enugu 3 23 6 50 79 3 23 21 50 79 
Gombe 3 29 34 74 129 3 29 34 74 129 
Imo 3 30 63 38 134 3 30 63 38 134 
Jigawa 3 27 27 120 179 3 27 27 120 179 
Kaduna 3 36 59 105 202 3 36 59 105 202 
Kano 3 67 17 104 45 3 67 17 104 45 
Katsina 3 Na 38 103 3 3 Na 38 103 3 
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Kebbi 3 24 9 133 na 3 24 9 133 na 
Kogi 5 32 123 79 137 5 32 123 79 137 
Kwara 3 46 7 85 141 3 46 7 85 141 
Lagos 8 na 128 78 298 8 na 128 78 298 
Nasarawa 3 17 317 118 45 4 36 60 118 45 
Niger 4 36 60 115 171 3 17 39 115 171 
Ogun 5 31 25 65 10 5 31 25 65 10 
Ondo 3 31 36 26 93 3 31 36 26 93 
Osun 3 33 47 32 170 4 47 50 32 170 
Oyo 4 47 50 47 130 3 33 47 47 130 
Plateau 2 25 101 174 256 2 25 101 174 256 
Rivers 3 38 34 63 103 3 38 34 63 103 
Sokoto 2 26 3 44 75 2 26 3 44 75 
Taraba 3 17 71 123 33 3 17 71 123 33 
Yobe 3 18 19 70 20 3 18 19 70 20 
Zamfara 3 36 35 62 136 3 36 35 62 136 
FCT/Abuja 3 16 11 44 7 3 16 11 44 7 
Railways 5 9 30 Na 44 5 9 30 Na 44 
PAP 2 7 7 4 20 2 7 7 4 20 
Airport 1 3 Na 2 6 1 3 Na 2 6 
Total 126 1,040 1,576 2,631 3,919 126 1,040 1,598 2,634 3,820 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2008:114). Note: na= not available 
Table 5: Small arms seized by police, 2000–2010 
Year No. of arms seized
2000-2001 1,941 
2002 3,150 
2003 3,451 
2007 About 2,098 
2010 over 1,283 
Source: Vanguard, July 7, 2004; Thisday, February 14, 2007; Leadership, July 5, 2010. 
Table 6: Salaries of the Nigerian Police Officers Per Month and Per Year 
S/No Rank Salary per month Salary per annum  $ Equivalent per month $ Equivalent per annum 
1 CP #39,649.00k #475,788.00k $287.3 $3447.6 
2 DC #34,993.00k #419,916.00k $253.5 $3042 
3 AC #31,605.00k #379,260.00k $229 $2748 
4 CSP 28,801.00k #345,612.00k $208.7 $2504.4 
5 SP 26,197.00k #314,364.00k $189.8 $2277.6 
Public Policy and Administration Research                                        www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-5731(Paper) ISSN 2225-0972(Online) 
Vol.2, No.2, 2012 
 
 
37 
 
6 DSP #22,565.00k #270,780.00k $163.5 $1962 
7 ASP #19,594.00k #235,128.00k $141.9 $1702.8 
8 INSPR 13,002.00k #156,024.00k $94.2 $1130.4 
9 SGT #8,370.00k #100,440.00k $60.6 $727.2 
10 CPL #7,104.00k #85,248.00k $51.4 $616.6 
11 PC #6,455.00k #77,460.00k $46.7 $560.4 
Source: Afe Babalola, in the Nigerian Tribune, December 17, 2001. 
Table 7: Nigerian Police Force Small Arms and Ammunition 
 Source: Small Arms Survey (2007a) Security Agencies, Small Arms, and Violence in Nigeria. Switzerland: Small Arms 
Survey. 
        Table 8: Profiles of the Armed Groups in the Niger Delta 
Types of arms Present 
holdings
Estimated Additional 
Requirements over 
 the next five  years 
Rifles (various models): 
K2; FWC; SMG Model 12; SMG Beretta; Sterling; Beretta; pump-action 
shotgun; sub-machine gun; AK-47 
65,000 510,500 
Pistols (various models): 
Revolver 38 mm; revolver chief special shot; Browning 9 mm; revolver 38 mm 
chief long; Browning DA; Browning 32mm; 
Beretta 9 mm 
8,524 20,000 
Ammunition: 
5.56 mm for rifles 
9 mm for rifles 
(Rounds)
65,000 
434,000 
(Rounds) 
5,000,000 
100,000 
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Name Year 
formed
Membership Sources of Weapons/ 
Stockpiles 
Funding/Support 
The Bush Boys 1999 Over 3,000 Purchases from illegal arms dealers Politicians and Chiefs of the 
Okrika community, 
including 
former governor Ada George 
and Chief Sergeant Awuse, the
Rivers state 2007  
gubernatorial candidate 
Deebam (aka. 
Klansmen 
Konfraternity 
(KK) 
1991 3,000 in Tombia, 
Degema LGA; 
2,500 in Bukuma, 
Degema LGA; 
and 6,000 in Port 
Harcourt 
Purchases from illegal arms dealers Sir Celestine Omehia, 
Kenneth Kobani; and 
Chief Fred Barivale 
Kpakol, chairman of 
Gokana LGA. 
Deewell Late 1990sOver 4,000 members Purchases from illegal arms dealers Allegedly Rotimi 
Amaechi, Sir Celestine 
Omehia; Gabriel 
Pidomson Jr. etc. 
Icelander (also known 
as  
Germans and NDVS
Created by 
the 
Rivers State
Government 
in 
Mid-2000
10,000 members 
in Rivers and 
Bayelsa states (A 
PDP family) 
AK-47s, 7 general purpose machine 
guns, 8 other machine guns, locally 
made craft pistols, and both 7.62 mm 
and 5.56 mm ammunition; AMD 65s; 
12 59/M66s; and several Type 65-1s, 
Beretta BM59s, FN FALs, and 
AK-47s. 
Allegedly from Governor  
Peter Odili and Transport  
Minister Dr Abiye Sekibo 
MEND (Movement 
for 
the Emancipation of 
the Niger Delta) 
Ja uary 
2006 
Over 2,000 fighters AK-47s or their  
derivatives, RPGs, and  
UK 59 Rachot machine  
guns 
Mainly self sufficient 
NDPVF (Niger Delta 
Peoples Volunteer 
Force) 
2003 About 5,000 members - Proceeds from illegal oil  
bunkering 
NDSF (Niger Delta 
Strike Force) 
2004 About 60 members 
(but with other  
Supports numbers 
Over 600) 
RPGs and dynamite at its disposal, as 
well as Russian-made AK-47s, or 
variants of the AK,  
and PK machine guns. 
Allegedly funded by the 
Action Congress 
governorship candidate for 
Rivers state in the April 
2007 elections Prince Tonye 
Princewill and others. 
The Outlaws 2004 4,000 throughout  
Rivers state 
RPGs, sub-machine guns, and AK-47 
derivatives 
Allegedly PDP Rivers  
State 
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Source: Adapted from Hazen, J.M., and Horner, J. (2007) “Small Arms, Armed Violence, and Insecurity in Nigeria: The Niger Delta 
in Perspective” in Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper 20. Switzerland. 
Table 9: Activities of Various Militant Groups Operating in Niger Delta from January 2006-July 2009. 
Date Incident Location Casualty 
Jan. 11, 2006Attack on Royal Dutch/shell’s oil facilities Offshore field 
Rivers State 
4 foreign workers 
 kidnapped 
Jan. 11, 2006Explosion on major crude oil pipeline operated by  
Royal Dutch/Shell 
Forcados, Delta - 
Jan. 15, 2006Royal Dutch/Shell facilities was attacked by MEND Port Harcourt 17 soldiers killed 
May 10, 2006An executive with US based oil company,Baker Hughes 
 was shot and killed 
Port Harcourt 1 death occured 
June 2, 2006A Norwegian offshore rig was attacked Port Harcourt 16 crew members 
kidnapped 
Aug. 21, 2006Clash between MEND and security agencies Bayelsa 10 MEND fighters killed
Sept. 12, 2006Militants attacked Chevron offshore oil field Delta 1 worker killed 
Oct. 2, 2006MEND fighters attack Nigerian soldiers patrol boat offshore 10 soldiers killed 
Oct. 2, 2006A Nigerian/Royal Dutch Shell convoy was attacked Port Harcourt Some officials wounded
Oct. 3, 2006Western oil workers taken hostage Bayelsa 7 Western oil workers
Taken hostage 
Oct. 4, 2006Nigerian soldiers stormed a militant camp Rivers 9 soldiers were killed
Nov. 22, 2006Clash between Nigerian soldiers and some militants When 
soldiers stormed a militant camp to rescue Kidnapped oil 
workers 
Rivers 1 soldier died 
Dec. 7, 2006Kidnap of foreign oil workers Rivers 4 foreign oil workers 
Kidnapped 
Dec. 21, 2006Obagi pumping station attacked Delta 3 guards killed 
Jan. 16, 2007Militants attacked an oil vessel near Bonny Island Bonny Island, Rivers- 
March 4, 2007Major spill at a pipeline feeding the Bonny export terminal 
due to sabotage 
Rivers - 
May 1, 2007Six expatriate workers from an offshore facility  
Owned by Chevron were seized 
Funiwa, Delta 6 oil woekers kidnapped
May 3, 2007MEND fighters seized eight foreign oil workers from an 
offshore vessel  
Rivers 8 foreign oil workers 
Held hostage 
May 4, 2007Saipen site was attacked causing shuts in production Okono/Okpoh Several oil workers 
Wounded 
May 7, 2007Protests caused Chevron to shut down the  Abiteye flow 
station that feeds Escravos export terminal 
Abiteye, Delta 
State 
- 
May 8, 2007Three major oil pipelines (one in Brass and two  Brass/Akasa, - 
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In the Akasa area) run by Agip were attacked Bayelsa State 
May 10, 2007Protesters occupied the Bomu pipeline system Causing Shell
 shut-in production feeding Bonny Light export route 
Bomu, Rivers - 
May 16, 2007Gunmen attacked the country home of the Vice President
 (now President Goodluck Jonathan) 
Ogbia, Bayelsa - 
May 28, 2007Protests at Bomu pipeline system made Shell to 
Shut-in production through its Nembe Creek trunk 
Bomu, Rivers - 
June 14, 2007Gunmen stormed the Ogainbiri flow station operated by 
 Eni Petroleum 
Ogainbiri, Delta 24 workers taken hos
June 18, 2007Militants overran the Chevron-Eni Abiteye flow station 
causing shut-in crude oil production 
Port Harcourt 30 innocent citizens 
 died in the attack 
Aug. 3, 2007Militants attacked Port Harcourt city destroying some public
 properties such as the NNPC mega filling station and radio 
station 
Port Harcourt 30 innocent citizens 
 died in the attack 
Sept. 20, 2007Gunmen claiming to be MEND kidnapped 11 Members of
 the ruling PDP 
Southern Ondo 
State 
11 persons kidnapped
Oct. 20, 2007MEND attacked a Columbian oil worker - 1 death 
Oct. 26, 2007Six oil workers attacked - Six oil workers kidnapped
Oct. 30, 2007Naval warship, NNS Obula, deployed to rescue the EA 
Field belonging to Shell was attacked 
Offshore, Rivers 1 death and five others
Sustained serious injury
Oct. 31, 2007MEND attacked a naval officer Rivers 1 naval officer killed 
Nov. 12, 200735 militants engaged naval officers manning the 
Qua Iboe terminal of EXXON Mobil 
Iboe, Akwa IbomA pregnant woman Killed
 and 25 persons wound
Nov. 15, 2007MEND attacked Shell facility Rivers - 
Nov. 25, 2007JTF clashed with MEND near a natural gas facility of ShellSoku, Rivers - 
Dec. 4, 2007MEND attacked Exxon Mobil Rivers 1 killed 
Dec. 31, 2007Militants invaded two police stations at Trans Amadi and 
Borokiri 
Port Harcourt 4 police men and 11 
Others lost their lives
Jan. 11, 2008Petroleum tanker ship was attacked at the Nigerian Ports 
Authority by Freedom Freelance Fighters (FFF) of MEND
Port Harcourt 2 persons injured 
Feb. 3, 2008MEND attacked a military house boat stationed 
At the Shell Petroleum Tara manifold 
Tara Manifold 
Bayelsa 
2 killed 
Feb. 11, 2008Gunmen attacked a supply vessel belonging to Total Oil 
Nig Ltd. MV Patience at Buoy 35 
Kalaibama, link 
Bonny island 
- 
Feb. 11, 2008Militants attacked a naval gunboat belonging to the  
Pathfinder Naval escorting NLNG boats 
From Port Harcourt at Bonny 
Rivers 4 people killed 
March 19, Exchange of fire between militants and oil  Industry securityRivers - 
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2008  ship 
March 21, 2008MEND attacked naval ship causing explosion Rivers - 
April 2, 2008Two oil flow station belonging to Agip Oil  Company 
 located offshore Forcados were blown off 
Rivers - 
April 13, 2008Agip vessels bombed Forcados, Rivers10 naval officers died and
Some militants 
April 15, 2008Serial attacks launched on pipeline belonging to NNPC - - 
April 19, 2008MEND fighters crippled Shell Adamakri crude flow stationDelta/Edo 6 people killed 
April 21, 2008MEND in ‘Operation Cyclone’ attacked two Major pipelines
of Shell Soku-Buguma and Buguma-Aklakri 
Adamakri 10 killed in the clash 
April 24, 2008MEND sabotage a major oil pipeline of Shell at Kula Rivers 6 expatriates kidnapped 
May 2, 2008Bayesa State Shell facility attacked, key facilities damagedBayelsa 5 persons kidnapped 
May 13, 2008Chevron oil vessel hijacked Kula, Rivers - 
May 26, 2008Assault on Rivers State Shell pipeline, forcing Closure Rivers 8 hostages taken 
June 9-10, 
2008 
Clashes between security forces and militants Delta 6 militants and 29 soldiers 
reportedly  died 
June 19, 2008MEND struck Shell’s Bonga facility on deep Offshore fieldRivers Over 100 deaths 
June 20, 2008Chevron facility attacked by militants Rivers - 
June 28, 2008Clashes between militants and soldiers Delta - 
July 16, 2008Clashes between militants and security forces Rivers/Bayelsa - 
Jul. 24/26, 2008Foreign oil workers attacked and kidnapped Rivers - 
July 28, 2008Two major attacks on Shell oil pipelines  - 
Aug. 8, 2008Militants attacked Ondo State Oil Producing Development
Commission (OSOPADEC) and 4 others 
Ileje, Ondo - 
Aug. 12, 2008Militants destroyed oil gas pipeline in Rivers State Rivers - 
Aug. 19, 2008Oil pipeline destroyed in Delta State Delta - 
Aug. 24, 2008Oil vessel at Bonny Island, Rivers hijacked Rivers - 
Aug. 30, 2008Militants and security forces clashed Rivers - 
Sep.13-15, 
2008 
Kula oil platform operated by Chevron and  Alakri, and
flow station operated by Shell were attacked 
Rivers - 
July 12, 2009MEND attacked Atlas Cove Jetty with caliber machine gunsLagos 4 Naval officers 
Source: November 2008 Report of Technical Committee on Niger Delta (See also Newswatch, May 4, 2009, Vol. 49 No. 18; 
Vanguard, July 15, 2009). 
Table 10: Armed Robbery Statistics Classified into Various Offences/Involvement 2002-2007 
Year Robbery Cases  
Reported to the  the 
Police 
Persons 
Arr sted 
Persons 
Prosecuted
Persons/ 
Cases  
Awaiting 
trial 
Civilians
Killed by
Armed 
robbers 
Armed 
Robbers 
Killed by 
police 
Armed 
Robbers  
Injured  
By police 
Cases Pending 
Investigation 
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2002 2,968 2,907 353 817 371 317 99 1,708 
2003 2,949 3,814 1,026 1,048 335 544 190 1,525 
2004 3,184 na na na na na na na 
2005 2,325 na na na na na na na 
2006 2,916 2,946 135 303 233 329 28 1,208 
2007 2,506 na na na na na na na 
    Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2008:122).   Note: na= not available 
   Table 11: Cases of Missing Persons/Kidnappings, 2002-2007 
Year Number of Missing  
Persons 
Number of Persons  
Traced 
Number of Persons  
not Traced  
2002 1,334 886 448 
2003 1,273 772 451 
2004 1,316 548 768 
2005 1,080 575 505 
2006 1,374 931 443 
2007 867 446 421 
   Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2008:134-136). 
Table 12: Chronicles of Bomb blasts in Nigeria Since 1986 
Date Incidence/Target Group ResponsibleVictims/Damages 
October 19, 1986 Letter bomb - Dele Giwa lost his dear life
March 31, 1995 Lauch of Miriam Abacha’s  
family support program 
- - 
January 18, 1996 Darbur Hotel, Kaduna state - Bagauda Kaliho (press man) 
died 
April 25, 1996 Air Force Base, Ikeja, Lagos - - 
January 20, 1996 Aminu Kano International Airport - Olushola Omoshola (CSO) 
and  
Nelson Gbolahor Kasim died
December 16 Colonel Buba Marwa Convoy - - 
December 18, 1996 Lagos state Task Force bus - - 
April 22, 1997 Evans square, Lagos state - 3 died and several injuries
May 13, 1997 Fed. Min. of Works, Ibadan - - 
December 13, 1997 Nnamdi Azikiwe Int. Airport - Lt. Gen. Oladipo Diya 
escapes death 
January 20, 2002   Ikeja Military Cantonement, Lagos 
state 
- 600 persons died 
May 28, 2005 Residence of Ikono Head of  
Council Area, Ikono, Akwa Ibom state
- - 
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November 25, 2006 PDP Secretariat, Bayelsa state - Building destroyed 
November 28, 2006 Owan East LGA, Edo state - Godwin Aigbekhai died 
December 5, 2006   Then Governor Goodluck Jonathan
  Campeign Office, Bayelsa 
- - 
December 11, 2006 Ndudi Elumelu Campeign office, Delta- - 
December 23, 2006 Government house, Port Harcourt MEND - 
March 18, 2009 A farm in Ikeja Military cantonment - A student blown to pieces
July 12, 2009 Atlas Cove Jetty oil Facility, Lagos MEND five 
December 22, 2009 Letter bomb targeted to Superscreen 
Television 
- - 
April 11, 2010 Dandin Kowa, Jos, Plateau state Bomb maker Chopped off both hands 
of Abdulsalam Mohammed
March 16, 2010   Near the arena of Post Amnesty 
Dialogue  
 organized by Vanguard, Warri, Delta 
state 
MEND 1 killed 
May 2, 2010 Close to Dep. Gov. Peremobowei  
Ebebi, Bayelsa 
- - 
May 3, 2010 Mechanic workshop, Warri - - 
October 1, 2010   Close to Eagles square, on 
independence 
MEND 12 died, 36 injured 
December 27, 2010 Barkin Ladi, outskirts of Jos Boko Haram - 
December 24, 2010 Jos city Boko Haram 30 died 
December 31, 2010   Mogadishu Mammy Market, Abuja - 4 died 
April 7, 2011   Polling booth, Unguwar Doki, 
Maiduguri 
Boko Haram More than 10 injured 
April 8, 2011 INEC Office, Suleja Boko Haram 11 youth corps members died
April 15, 2011 Maiduguri Council Office of INEC - - 
April 21, 2011 Bomb makers died, Kaduna - 2 died 
April 25, 2011 Tudu Palace Hotel and Kano motor 
 park, Maiduguri 
Boko Haram - 
April 27, 2011 Bomb averted, INEC office, Oron, 
A/Ibom 
- - 
May 28, 2011 Mammy market,  
Shandawanka Barracks, Bauchi 
Boko Haram 13 died, 40 injured 
May 29, 2011 Zuba, outskirts of  Kubua, Abuja Boko Haram 14 killed, 8 lose limbs 
June 11, 2011 Bomb averted, United Methodist  
Church, Bauchi 
Boko Haram - 
Public Policy and Administration Research                                        www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-5731(Paper) ISSN 2225-0972(Online) 
Vol.2, No.2, 2012 
 
 
44 
 
June 16, 2011    National Force Headquarters, AbujaBoko Haram 13 died, many people 
injured, 
over 70 cars burnt 
June 16, 2011
 
Dambowa, Maidugri
 
Boko Haram
 3 died 
July 10, 2001    All Christian Fellowship Cen
Suleja
 
Boko Haram 3 persons critically injured
August 26, 2011   United Nations House, Abuja Boko Haram 25 persons died, over 100 
injured 
September 11, 2011  Twin bomb exploded at Obelende, JosFulani men none 
October 10, 2011 Twin bomb exploded at Maiduguri Boko Haram 3 soldiers, one killed, a van 
burnt 
Source: Adapted from Vanguard, July 8, 2011; Vanguard, July 11, 2011; Vanguard, August 27, 2011. The Punch, September 12, 
2011. The Nation, October 11, 2011. 
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